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ABAY V. ASHCROFT: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S BASELESS
EXPANSION OF INA § 101(a)(42)(A) REVEALED A GAP IN
ASYLUM LAW
Wes Henricksen
Abstract: In Abay v. Ashcroft, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that a noncitizen mother qualified for asylum based on her fear that her daughter, who
qualified as a refugee, would undergo female genital mutilation if her daughter were to return
to the family's home country. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides
derivative asylum for spouses and children, but not parents, of refugees granted asylum.
Parents of asylees must therefore independently qualify for asylum under INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A), which requires that the applicant show a well-founded fear of persecution if
returned to the applicant's home country. The circuit courts of appeals have generally denied
refugee status to mothers in situations similar to that of the petitioner in Abay. Nevertheless,
the Abay court concluded that there is a "governing principle" in favor of granting asylum to
mothers when their daughters would face genital mutilation upon return to the family's home
country. This Note argues that the Abay court erred in granting asylum to the petitioner
mother because no such "governing principle" exists. Further, this Note argues that the
mother in Abay lacked a well-founded fear of persecution, making her ineligible for asylum,
for two reasons. First, harm to her daughter did not amount to persecution of the mother.
Second, because her daughter is a refugee, the petitioner cannot reasonably fear the genital
mutilation of her daughter in the family's home country. When the law is correctly applied in
cases such as Abay, a mother of an asylee must choose between abandoning her child in the
United States or taking the child back to her home country where the child may be
persecuted. Congress did not contemplate this appalling predicament when it drafted the
current asylum laws. Accordingly, this Note concludes that Congress should amend the INA
to grant derivative asylum to parents of asylees.

United States immigration law is ill-equipped to handle situations
where children are the targets of persecution in their home countries but
their parents are not. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
provides derivative asylum to spouses and children of asylees. 1
However, parents of asylees are not included in the derivative asylum
provision.2 To gain asylum, parents must therefore independently satisfy
the requirements for refugee status under INA § 101(a)(42)(A).3
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(3)(A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2000)).
The INA generally defines "child" as an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age. INA
§ 101(b)(l) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2000)).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The lack of a derivative asylum provision for parents of asylees can
be attributed to the historic context in which the asylum provisions of the INA were passed. When
Congress initially added the refugee provisions to the INA through the Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
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Specifically, such parents must be outside of their country of nationality
and unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.4
Courts recognize several types of child persecution,5 and will grant
asylum directly to children who face such persecution.6 This Note
addresses one type of child persecution that is increasingly generating
litigation: female genital mutilation.7 This heinous procedure is
performed on an estimated two million young women and girls each
year in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.8 In many female genital

212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), the major humanitarian concerns that prompted the United States to extend
asylum to foreign citizens were political conflicts from the Cold War era, whose victims fled
oppression in their home countries to seek freedom in the United States. See Michael J. Parrish,
Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a Basis for Refugee
Protection, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 223, 234 n.63 (2000). As such, laws passed at this time that
granted asylum to refugees politically persecuted abroad were primarily concerned with adult
applicants, whose families would be included in their claim. See 8 U.S.C. § II 58(b)(3)(A) (stating
that derivative asylum is available to spouses and children, but not parents, of asylees).
4. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A).
5. Annette Lopez, CreatingHope for Child Victims of Domestic Violence in PoliticalAsylum
Law, 35 U. MtAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 603, 609 (2004) ("[C]ircumstances that amount to child
persecution [include] infanticide, child abuse, incest, female genital mutilation, and child sale.").
There are two statutory grounds for child persecution that allow parents that accompany or follow to
join the asylee child to be granted the same status as the child. One of them, the "T" visa, allows
human trafficking victims under the age of twenty-one to immigrate their parents where the children
were victims of severe human trafficking and assisted a government investigation and prosecution
of the offenders, or because the children were under eighteen years of age when trafficked. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1l01(a)(15)(T) (2000). The other, the "U" visa, allows parents to immigrate with their minor
children if the children were victims of certain violent crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2000).
6. See In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358, 368 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc) (holding that female
genital mutilation victim qualified for asylum based on persecution).
7. See id. at 358 (holding that female genital mutilation may constitute "persecution" for purposes
of U.S. asylum law). The procedure is referred to by many courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) as "FGM." However, this Note will follow the lead of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and use the full three-word phrase "female genital mutilation" or
substitute the shortened phrase "genital mutilation" in lieu of using the initialism "FGM." See
Mohammed v. Gonzales, No. 03-70803, slip op. 3063, 3068 n.2 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2005). As noted
by the Ninth Circuit, "[t]he use of the initials, if it has any effect, serves only to dull the senses and
minimize the barbaric nature of the practice." Id.
8. World Health Organization, Fact Sheet No. 241: Female Genital Mutilation (June 2000), at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en [hereinafter Female Genital Mutilation]. The
permanent consequences of the procedure, which involves removal of part or all of the external
female genitalia, ensures it will normally be undertaken no more than once per victim. One of the
seminal cases addressing the procedure found that female genital mutilation "'has been used to
control wom[e]n's sexuality' ... [and] is characterized as a form of 'sexual oppression' that is
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mutilation cases, the female child who is potentially subject to genital
mutilation upon return to her family's home country has a legal right to
9
remain in the United States through citizenship, legal permanent
resident status,10 or asylum based on persecution that is particular to
her. 1' However, the child's parents often do not have independent
claim. 12
grounds upon which to file an asylum
13
In Abay v. Ashcroft, a court held for the first time that a mother may
qualify for asylum under INA § 101(a)(42)(A) if she fears that her
daughter would undergo genital mutilation were her daughter to return to
the family's home country.' 4 In its opinion, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on a handful of administrative
decisions to conclude that there is a "governing principle" in favor of
granting refugee status to mothers like the petitioner, Yayeshwork
Abay. 15 Following this6 governing principle, the court held that Abay
qualified as a refugee.'
This Note argues that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that Abay's
fear that her daughter would undergo genital mutilation in their home
country qualified her as a refugee. The administrative decisions cited by
the Abay court do not amount to a "governing principle" in favor of
7
granting asylum to mothers like Abay.1 Absent this governing principle,
Abay did not qualify for asylum because the fear that her daughter
would be subjected to the persecution of genital mutilation did not
amount to persecution of Abay. Moreover, any fear Abay initially
possessed could no longer be well-founded once her daughter qualified
'based on the manipulation of women's sexuality in order to assure male dominance and
exploitation."' Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 366.
9. See, e.g., Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that daughters were
U.S. citizens).
10. See, e.g., Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that daughters were
legal permanent residents).
11. See, e.g., Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that daughter was
refugee and therefore eligible for asylum).
12. See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 698, 704-05 (holding that, although legal permanent resident
daughters feared female genital mutilation if returned to mother's native country, mother was
ineligible for asylum); Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618 (holding that, although U.S. citizen daughters feared
genital mutilation if returned to mother's native country, mother did not qualify for asylum).
13. 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
14. Id. at 642.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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as a refugee.
Part I of this Note reviews the law of asylum. Part II discusses asylum
based on harm to an applicant's family member. Part III analyzes the
facts, procedural history, holding, and reasoning of Abay v. Ashcroft.
Part IV argues that the Abay court erroneously concluded that a mother
may qualify for asylum under INA § 101 (a)(42)(A) based exclusively on
her fear that her daughter may be subject to genital mutilation upon her
return to their home country. This Note concludes that the Sixth
Circuit's approach is unfortunate because such a change in the law
would be better effectuated through an amendment to the INA that
confers derivative asylum on parents of asylee children.
I.

A NONCITIZEN MAY BE GRANTED ASYLUM IF HE OR
SHE QUALIFIES AS A REFUGEE UNDER THE INA

To qualify for asylum, a noncitizen applicant has the burden of
establishing that he or she is a refugee as defined in § 101(a)(42)(A) of
the INA. 19 This section defines a refugee as a person who is outside of
his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return to
that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 20 The "persecution" element imposes a high standard
that the applicant must meet, and requires more than a showing of

18. Abay's daughter, Amare, was granted refugee status by the Abay court, id. at 640, which
rendered her eligible for, but did not guarantee, asylum. See id. at 636 (noting that U.S. Attorney
General, who is represented by immigration courts, has discretion to grant asylum). On remand, an
immigration judge has discretion as to whether to grant asylum. See id. However, because the case
was remanded to the immigration judge "for proceedings not inconsistent with [the Sixth Circuit's]
opinion," id. at 643, the immigration judge would be unlikely to deny Amare asylum. For the
purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that Amare acquired a legal right to remain in the United
States upon gaining refugee status.
19. 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42)(A) (2000). The U.S. Attorney General, normally represented by
asylum officers, may grant asylum to any applicant who qualifies as a refugee and is not barred by
any of the grounds for inadmissibility. Id. § 11 58(b)(1 )-(2). Unsuccessful applicants can appeal the
asylum officer's decision to an immigration court, 8 C.F.R. § 2 08.31(g) (2004); then to the BIA, id.
§ 1003.1(b); and then to the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit where the original
application was filed. See United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, Board of lmmigration Appeals, 3, at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2005) ("All Board decisions are subject to judicial review in the Federal courts.").
Throughout this process, the applicant bears the burden of establishing asylum eligibility under INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A). 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
20. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A).
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offensive treatment. 2' In addition, the applicant must show that his or her
22
fear of persecution is "well-founded., An applicant may show a wellfounded fear of persecution by demonstrating that there is a reasonable
possibility that the applicant would suffer persecution upon returning to
the applicant's home country.23
A.

To Be Eligiblefor Asylum, an Applicant Must Show Harm that
Rises to the Level of Persecution

To demonstrate persecution under INA § 101 (a)(42)(A), an applicant
must show extreme harm 24 that either occurred in the past or may occur
in the future.25 This extremity requirement does not limit persecution to
27
severe physical harm 26 or threats to life or freedom, such as severe
30
29
beatings,28 torture, or fear of death. Rather, courts have held that
3
persecution also includes lesser forms of physical harm. ' In addition,
courts may consider mental harm as an element-but not as the
32
exclusive basis-of an applicant's persecution.
21. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(B).
24. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1243 ("'[P]ersecution' is an extreme concept that does not include every
sort of treatment our society regards as offensive."); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir.
1969) ("'[P]ersecution' is too strong a word to be satisfied by proof of the likelihood of minor
disadvantage or trivial inconvenience.").
25. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
26. See Zhao v. Gonzalez, 2005 WL 590829, at *8 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2005) ("The harm or
suffering need not be physical, but may take other forms .... "); accord In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 433, 456-57 (B.I.A. 1983) ("The harm or suffering need not [only] be physical .... ), rev'd
on othergrounds, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
27. See Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he statutory term
'persecution' includes more than just restrictions on life and liberty .... ").
28. See, e.g., Vladimirova v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The physical violence
suffered by petitioner-a beating so severe that it caused a miscarriage-certainly ... qualifies as
proof of past persecution.").
29. See, e.g., In re S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 486, 495-96 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding persecution in
case of detention, interrogation, and torture); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 n.9 (B.I.A.
1985) (discussing meaning of persecution; noting that "[t]he harm or suffering inflicted could
consist of confinement or torture"), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441
(B.I.A. 1987).
30. See, e.g., Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that death threats
by Shining Path guerrillas in Peru constituted persecution).
31. See, e.g., Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that "non-lifethreatening violence and physical abuse" may constitute persecution).
32. See Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that "mental or
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Courts have held that female genital mutilation is extreme physical
harm and that the future threat of it constitutes persecution of the
applicant.3 3 In In re Kasinga,34 the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
granted asylum to a nineteen-year-old applicant who feared that she
would be forced to undergo genital mutilation if removed to her home
country of Togo. 35 In determining that the fear of female genital
mutilation qualifies as persecution, the BIA reasoned that a "subjective
'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is not required for harm to constitute
persecution." 36 No court has abrogated the BIA's holding in Kasinga;
the few courts of appeals that have considered the same question have
favorably cited the Kasinga board's holding.37
Mental suffering may also contribute to a finding of persecution, 38 but
only where it is accompanied by physical harm or a threat of physical
harm.39 Where the BIA has relied on mental suffering in its persecution
determination, it has found mental harm to be a critical, but not
conclusive, aspect of the persecution.40 The mental harm must be severe
in order to contribute to an asylum claim, 4 1 and it must be accompanied
emotional injury may in part constitute persecution") (emphasis added); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW
OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 215 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that mental harm can be "main
element" of finding of persecution for asylum purposes) (emphasis added).
33. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, No. 03-70803, slip op. 3063, 3068 n.2 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2005);
Toure v. Ashcroft, No. 03-1706, 2005 WL 247942, at *6 n.4 (lst Cir. Feb. 3, 2005); In re Kasinga,
211. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996).
34. 211. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
35. Id. at 358.
36. Id. at 365.
37. See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2004); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d
1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2004); Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 2002).
38. See Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that "mental or emotional
injury may in partconstitute persecution") (emphasis added); ANKER, supra note 32, at 215 (stating
that mental harm can be "main element" of finding of persecution for asylum purposes).
39. See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining that, where people of
opposing political viewpoint forced entry into applicant's home, beat his father, and threatenedbut did not physically harm-applicant if he refused to join their cause, applicant was persecuted,
but upholding denial of asylum because of lack of nexus to statutory ground); In re S-P-, 21 1. &
N. Dec. 486, 488 n. 1 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that mental abuses, six-month detention, beatings, and
other physical harm constituted persecution). Certain mental harm may, alone, allow an applicant to
apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2004).
However, the CAT is inapposite to this Note's analysis.
40. See, e.g., S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 488 n.1 (noting mental abuses, along with six-month
detention, beatings, and other physical harm, constituted persecution); In re B-, 21 1. & N. Dec.
66, 72 (B.I.A. 1995) (holding that combination of psychological and physical abuse, including
torture and food deprivation, established persecution).
41. ANKER, supra note 32, at 214.
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by actual or threatened physical harm. 4 2 For example, in Lopez-Galarza
v. INS,43 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
that the petitioner, who was raped by Nicaraguan Sandinistas while
imprisoned, had been persecuted."a In its holding, the court emphasized
the "severe and long-lasting psychological" harms associated with
rape. 45 Although the court considered mental suffering to be central to
the persecution determination,46 the underlying harm was a physical one:
rape. Similarly, in In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 47 the BIA considered the
mental suffering caused by beatings and humiliations of the applicant's
son as an element of the applicant's persecution.4 8 However, the
applicant also suffered repeated beatings, 49 which provided the
underlying physical harm normally required in cases where the
applicant's persecution is based, in part, on mental suffering.50 In
contrast, the applicant persecuted in Sangha v. INS5 1 was not physically
harmed by his persecutors.52 However, he was threatened with physical
harm if he refused to join the persecutors' political movement.5 3
B.

According to INA § 101(a)(42)(A), an Applicant's Fearof
PersecutionMust Be Well-Founded
To establish eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded fear of

42. See, e.g., Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1487 (determining that, where people of opposing political
viewpoint forced entry into applicant's home, beat his father, and threatened applicant if he refused
to join their cause, applicant was persecuted); Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding past persecution because of "severe and long-lasting" psychological harms
associated with applicant's treatment while imprisoned, including rape); In re O-Z- & I-Z-,
22 1. & N. Dec. 23, 25-26 (B.I.A. 1998) (considering mental suffering caused by beatings and
humiliations of applicant's son as element of applicant father's persecution, where father also
suffered repeated beatings and received multiple handwritten threats).
43. 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996).
44. Id. at 962.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 962-63.
47. 22 1.& N. Dec. 23 (B.I.A. 1998).
48. Id. at 25-26.
49. Id.
50. See Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that "mental or emotional
injury may in part constitute persecution") (emphasis added); ANKER, supra note 32, at 215 (stating
that mental harm can be "main element" of finding of persecution for asylum purposes).
51. 103 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1997).
52. Id. at 1487.
53. Id.
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persecution, an applicant must show that there is a reasonable possibility
of suffering persecution upon returning to the applicant's home
country. 54 In In re Mogharrabi,55 the BIA noted that an applicant for
asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in
the applicant's circumstances would fear persecution.5 6 Furthermore,
circuit courts have held that an applicant's fear "must be both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.",57 An applicant can
show a subjectively genuine fear by demonstrating an unfeigned fear of
persecution 58 that serves as the primary motivation for requesting refuge
in the United States. 59 In order to be objectively reasonable, an
applicant's fear must have some basis in reality; apprehension grounded
in fantasy will not suffice. 60 However, persecution does not have to be a
certainty; at least one court has found that an applicant who faces as
little as a one-in-ten chance of persecution can establish an objectively
reasonable, well-founded fear of persecution.61
In addition, the well-founded fear standard is future-oriented, 62 aimed
at protecting noncitizens from future persecution. To establish a wellfounded fear of persecution, an applicant must either make a showing of
past persecution, as evidence that future persecution is likely, or satisfy
one of three tests for applicants lacking past persecution.63 These three
tests require a showing that either: (1) the applicant has been targeted for

54. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(B) (2004).
55. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
56. Id. at 445.
57. Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Zubeda v.Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463,
469 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that "the 'well-founded fear of persecution' that an alien must
demonstrate involves both a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable
possibility of persecution") (emphasis in original).
58. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 1.& N. Dec. at 446.
59. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, THE BASIC LAW
MANUAL 29 (1994).

60. See Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987).
61. See Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that fear is wellfounded when applicant, "on the basis of objective circumstances personally known to him, believes
that he has at least a one in ten chance of being killed by the guerrillas"); see also Martirosyan v.
INS, 229 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Montecino standard). The one-in-ten standard
appears to be the most liberal well-founded fear standard put forth. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 976 (3d ed. 2002).

62. ANKER, supra note 32, at32.
63. Id. at33.
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future persecution; 64 (2) persons similarly situated to the applicant have
been or are being persecuted; 65 or (3) the applicant has a well-founded
fear of future persecution under the "totality of the circumstances. 66
In sum, applicants must establish that they meet the requirements of
INA § 101 (a)(42)(A) in order to be granted asylum. The "persecution"
requirement imposes a heavy burden for an applicant to satisfy.
Additionally, an applicant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
possibility that he or she will suffer the persecution feared upon
returning to the applicant's home country.
II.

IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, APPLICANTS MAY BASE
ASYLUM CLAIMS ON HARM TO FAMILY MEMBERS

Although the INA explicitly provides derivative asylum to spouses or
children of persons granted asylum, it does not extend this privilege to
parents or other family members of the person granted asylum. 67 In the
absence of derivative asylum, an applicant, in certain circumstances,
may nevertheless be able to satisfy the "well-founded fear of
persecution" requirement through a showing of harm to a member of the
applicant's family. 68 In general, harm to a family member will not rise to
the level of persecution of the applicant unless there is some indication
that the harm to the family member will lead to future harm to the
applicant. 69 However, courts have made an exception to this required
64. See, e.g., Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that evidence that
soldiers had been searching for Armenian Christian petitioner, along with State Department report
stating that membership in Armenian Christian minority in Iran creates presumption of asylum
eligibility, may be sufficient to establish well-founded fear); Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60,
62 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that participation in strike, murder of petitioner's labor-organizing
father by government, and warning by friend in labor ministry may suffice to establish well-founded
fear).
65. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2004).
66. ANKER, supra note 32, at 34.
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)(A) (2000).
68. See Al Ayed v. INS, No. 98-70142, 1999 WL 851452, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1999)
(recognizing that "[e]vidence of harm to a family member may support a finding of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution").
69. See, e.g., Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 845 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that "[t]o
succeed in [a] claim of derivative persecution, the [petitioner] must show a pattern of persecution
closely tied to the petitioner") (citations omitted); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir.
2003) ("Violence directed against an applicant's family members provides support for a claim of
persecution and in some instances is sufficient to establish persecution because such evidence 'may
well show that [an applicant's] fear.., of persecution is well founded."') (quoting OFFICE OF THE
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showing when the applicant's spouse is harmed due to coercive family
planning policies.7 ° Only recently have courts begun to address whether
asylum may be granted based on an applicant's fear of genital mutilation
of the applicant's daughter. The circuit courts have generally disallowed
asylum claims based on such a fear. 71 The immigration courts, however,
are in disagreement on the issue.7
A.

Harm to Family Members That Suggests Future Harm to the
Applicant May Establish a Well-Founded Fearof Persecution

The circumstances under which asylum claims may be based on harm
to an applicant's family member follow one general rule: the harm to the
family member somehow indicates a probability that the applicant will
become the victim of future persecution.7 3 Various scenarios can
establish this probability. For example, the applicant may establish
persecution if a persecutor harmed the applicant's family member in
order to persecute the applicant.74 An applicant may also demonstrate a
well-founded fear in circumstances where the persecutor mistakenly
harmed the family member when intending to harm the applicant.75
Moreover, where the applicant's family is itself the target of the
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR

DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 1143 (rev. 1992)); Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.
2003) (stating that to show derivative persecution, applicant must "show that her family's political
opinions have been imputed to her and that she has suffered or will suffer persecution as a result").
70. See In re C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc).
71. See infra Part II.B.
72. See infra Part ll.B.
73. See, e.g., Shoaira, 377 F.3d at 845 (concluding that "[t]o succeed in [a] claim of derivative
persecution, the [petitioner] must show a pattern of persecution closely tied to the petitioner")
(citations omitted); Baballah, 335 F.3d at 988 ("Violence directed against an applicant's family
members provides support for a claim of persecution and in some instances is sufficient to establish
persecution because such evidence 'may well show that [applicant's] fear ...of persecution is well
founded."') (quoting HANDBOOK, supra note 69, at 43); Ciorba,323 F.3d at 545 (stating that to
show derivative persecution, applicant must "show that her family's political opinions have been
imputed to her and that she has suffered or will suffer persecution as a result").
74. See, e.g., Carrasco-Humanani v. INS, 18 Fed. Appx. 607, 608-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
applicant was not refugee because he could not establish that he was intended target of murders of
his uncle and cousin); Meza-Manay v. INS, 139 F.3d 759, 761--64 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding applicant
was intended target of terrorist group Shining Path in Peru where group threatened applicant and her
husband, bombed husband's car, shot at husband, attempted to kidnap her children, and bombed inlaws' home).
75. See, e.g., Lopez-Carrillo v. INS, No. 97-70463, 1998 WL 19630, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 12,
1998) (holding that applicant failed to establish he was refugee because he lacked direct and specific
evidence that his brother's murderers had intended to kill applicant instead of applicant's brother).
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persecution, 76an applicant may have a well-founded fear of such
persecution.

Courts make one exception to the general rule when one spouse
suffers harm under a government's coercive population control
policies. 77 In In re C-Y-Z-, 78 the BIA held that a husband established
a well-founded fear of persecution based on the forced sterilization of
his wife. 79 The BIA pointed to an Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) 80 memorandum, which conceded that "the husband of a
sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes and make a bona fide
and non-frivolous application for asylum based on problems impacting
more intimately on her than on him.",8 ' The BIA further noted that while
the case was pending, Congress amended INA § 101(a)(42)(A) to codify
coercive population control programs as a valid ground for asylum for
couples. 82 Relying on the amendment of INA § 101(a)(42)(A) and the
government's concession, the BIA concluded that the applicant
tcrutcutdcsoshv
83
established past persecution. Subsequent circuit court decisions have
reinforced the notion that a spouse may establish persecution based on
84
coercive population control procedures performed on the other spouse.
However, courts have not extended this exception beyond the context of
76. See Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting asylum petition and noting
"it should now be clear that a pattern of persecution targeting a given family... supports a wellfounded fear of persecution by its surviving members").
77. See In re C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. 915, 918-19 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc).
78. 211. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997) (en bane).
79. Id. at 918.
80. The former INS is now the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service.
81. C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. at 918 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. at 917. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) amended INA § 101 (a)(42)(A) by adding the following: "For purposes of determinations
under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure ... shall
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion ....
208, § 601(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996)
("Couples with unauthorized children are subjected to excessive fines, and sometimes their homes
and possessions are destroyed.").
83. C-Y-Z-,211 .&N. Dec. at919.
84. See, e.g., Chen v. Asheroft, 381 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[P]erforming a forced
abortion or sterilization procedure on one spouse constitutes persecution of the other spouse because
of the impact on the latter's ability to reproduce and raise children."); Lin v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d
1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that forced sterilization of wife could be "imputed" to her
husband, "whose reproductive opportunities law considers to be bound up with those of wife"); Qiu
v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that petitioner may assert claim of
persecution on basis of wife's forced sterilization).
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coercive population control policies imposed on couples. 85 Some courts
have expressly declined to apply such a rule to parent-child
relationships.86
B.

Most Courts Hold that a Parent'sAsylum Claim May Not Be Based
Exclusively on the Genital Mutilation of a Daughter

Little statutory support exists for parents applying for asylum based
on harm to their children, even where such harm rises to the level of
persecution of the children. The INA provides spouses and children of
asylees with derivative asylum, which automatically qualifies them for
asylum based on their relationship to the asylee. 87 However, no similar
provision exists for parents of asylees.88 Therefore, to qualify for
asylum, parents of asylees must independently show a well-founded fear
of persecution. 89
In recent years, federal courts of appeals have addressed the issue of
whether a parent may qualify for asylum based on a fear that his or her
daughter would undergo genital mutilation if she were to return with the
mother to the parent's home country. 90 With the exception of the Sixth
Circuit, the circuit courts of appeals have held that parents do not qualify
for asylum based solely on a fear that their daughters will face genital
92
mutilation upon return to their home country. 91 In Oforji v. Ashcroft,

85. Chen, 381 F.3d at 222 (concluding that C-Y-Z- holding applied to Chinese couples who
were not legally married but were subject to that country's coercive population control policies); Ma
v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
86. See, e.g., Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
"parent... may not establish a... claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the alien's
United States citizen child"); Argueta-Rodriguez v. INS, No. 95-2367, 1997 WL 693064, at *1, *3,
*6 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997) (upholding, based on lack of well-founded fear of persecution, denial of
asylum to child who witnessed burning of her village and her family during massacre).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)(A) (2000).
88. See id.
89. See id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
90. See, e.g., Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering whether
mother qualified for asylum because her two daughters might undergo female genital mutilation if
they returned to mother's home country); Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2004);
Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
91. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying asylum to mother
notwithstanding the risk that her daughters may undergo female genital mutilation if they were to
return to mother's home country); Abebe, 379 F.3d at 759 (denying a petition for review by parents
whose daughter was at risk of undergoing genital mutilation in the parents' home country); Osigwe,
77 Fed. Appx. at 235 (holding that noncitizen parents are not eligible for asylum based exclusively
on daughter's risk of undergoing genital mutilation).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered
whether Doris C. Oforji, a Nigerian citizen, could qualify for asylum
because her two U.S. citizen daughters might be forced to undergo
genital mutilation if she returned to Nigeria with them.93 The Oforji
court acknowledged the difficult choice that Oforji would face if the
court denied her asylum: either desert her daughters in the United States
or bring them back to Nigeria, where they may face genital mutilation.94
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the denial of Oforji's asylum
application, and held that a parent may not establish a claim for asylum
based on potential persecution of the applicant's U.S. citizen children. 95
In a case with similar facts, the Seventh Circuit denied asylum to a
mother who feared that her legal permanent resident daughters would be
subjected to genital mutilation if they returned with her to Nigeria. 96 The
court noted that "current immigration laws do not allow an [immigration
judge] to factor in potential hardship to a petitioner's lawful97 resident or
citizen family members when considering an asylum claim.,
Other circuit courts have followed the Seventh Circuit's lead and
denied asylum to parents of children who face the possibility of female
genital mutilation upon return to their home country. 98 In Abebe v.
Ashcroft,99 the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review by parents
whose eight-year-old daughter was in danger of undergoing genital
mutilation in the parents' home country. The court noted that the threat
of persecution was to the daughter, and not to the parents.' 0 0 Likewise, in
an unpublished opinion of a case with similar facts, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that noncitizen parents "are
not eligible for asylum under the general asylum provisions based solely
on their daughter's risk of being subject[ed] to [female genital
mutilation] if she is returned to Nigeria."''
In contrast to the circuit courts, the BIA and the immigration courts
92. 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003).
93. Id. at 612.
94. Id.at 617.
95. Id. at 618.
96. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 697-98, 704-05.
97. Id. at 701 n.2.
98. See Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2004); Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 Fed. Appx.
235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
99. 379 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004).
100. See id. at 759.
101. Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
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offer conflicting guidance about whether a mother may base her asylum
claim on a fear that her daughter may undergo genital mutilation in the
mother's home country. In In re Anonymous, 0 2 a U.S. Immigration
Court judge denied asylum to a mother who feared that her daughtersat least one of whom would be constructively removed along with her
mother if she was not granted asylum' 03 -would be forced to undergo
Leone. 10 4
genital mutilation upon returning to her home country of Sierra
There, the immigration judge held that, even though "the [c]ourt
empathizes with the fears and concerns expressed by respondent, the
fear of [genital mutilation] to her daughters upon their return to Sierra
Leone is not persecution under the [INA].' ' 5
On the other hand, three administrative decisions have reached results
contrary to those in Anonymous.'0 6 However, unlike Anonymous, none of
07
the decisions applied the standard established in INA § 101 (a)(42)(A).1
In In re Oluloro,10 8 the immigration judge granted suspension of
deportation to the applicant because the risk that her U.S.-bom daughters
would be subjected to genital mutilation posed an "extreme hardship" to
the daughters. 0 9 The suspension of deportation standard used in
Oluloro, unlike the standard applied in asylum cases, allowed the U.S.
Attorney General to grant legal permanent resident status to removable
noncitizens who met certain minimal criteria. 1 ° In one case cited by the
available at
Justice),
(Dep't
1995]
28,
[Apr.
of
Matter
re
102. In
http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/40.pdf [hereinafter Anonymous].
103. At the time of the immigration court hearing, the respondent mother had been in the United
States for five years, and her eldest daughter was thirteen years old. See id. at 1-2. This indicates
that the daughter could not have been born a U.S. citizen, and she would presumably face
constructive removal alongside her mother.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id.
106. Those decisions are: In re Oluloro, No. A72 147 491 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994); In re
Adeniji, No. A41 542 131 (Dept. Justice Mar. 10, 1998) (cited in Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634,
641-42 (6th Cir. 2004)); and In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001).
107. See Oluloro, No. A72 147 491, at 17 (applying suspension of deportation); Abay, 368 F.3d
at 641-42 (noting that court in Adenii, No. A41 542 131, applied the withholding of removal
standard); Dibba,No. A73 541 857, at 2 (applying the reopen standard).
108. No. A72 147 491 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994).
109. Id. at 17.
110. See id. These criteria are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (2000). To meet these criteria at
the time of the Oluloro case, applicants must have: (1)been continually present in the United States
for seven years; (2) been of good moral character; (3) not been convicted of certain offenses; and (4)
established that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
noncitizen's parent, child, or spouse who was a U.S. citizen or lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. Oluloro, No. A72 147 491, at 14. Congress amended this statute in 1996 as part of
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Abay court, In re Adeniji, 11 the immigration judge granted relief to a
father under a different standard-withholding of removal' 1 2-because
his U.S. citizen daughters would likely be subject to genital
mutilation. 1 3 The third administrative decision that reached a result
contrary to that in Anonymous under a standard other than asylum was
the BIA's decision in In re Dibba. 14 There, the BIA granted a motion to
reopen an application for asylum 1 5 to a mother who feared that her
daughters would be 16subjected to genital mutilation if they returned with
her to The Gambia.'
In sum, although applicants may show a well-founded fear of
persecution based on harm to family members, the circumstances under
which they may do so are very limited. Applying the requirements of
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), circuit courts of appeals have generally held that
parents are not eligible for asylum based exclusively on a fear of genital
mutilation of a daughter. Despite this authority, immigration courts have
reached varying conclusions.

IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, see. 304, § 240A, 110 Stat. 3009-594 (1996). Consequently, the form
of relief formerly known as suspension of deportation is now called cancellation of removal.
LEGOMSKY, supra note 61, at 579. Additionally, applicants must now reside in the United States
continuously for ten years instead of seven. Id. at 581. Furthermore, under the former suspension of
deportation, harm to the applicant gave rise to a colorable claim for relief Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 163, 214-16 (1952). In contrast, the new
cancellation of removal only provides relief when the harm is to the applicant's spouse, parent, or
child. LEGOMSKY, supra note 61, at 584.
111. Abay, 368 F.3d at 641-42 (citing Adeniji, No. A41 542 131).
112. Id. Under the INA, "the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the
Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion," subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)-(B)
(2000). Unlike asylum applicants, applicants who meet the elements of withholding of removal are
automatically granted relief. Id. The standard applied under withholding of removal is whether it is
more likely than not the noncitizen would be persecuted upon return to the country. See INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984).
113. Abay, 368 F.3d at 641-24 (citing Adeniji, No. A41 542 131).
114. No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A.Nov. 23, 2001) (decision on motion to reopen).
115. In order to prevail on a motion to reopen to apply for asylum, the applicant must make a
prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 97 (1988); Guo v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004); Reyes v. INS, 673 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1992); see
also Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that, in order to prevail on a
motion to reopen removal proceedings, "appellant needed to show to this court 'some' likelihood of
success on the merits, part of a relatively low standard of review").
116. Dibba, No. A73 541 857, at 2. Applying the prima facie standard, the BIA granted Dibba's
motion to reopen an asylum application, even though she "ha[d] not fully demonstrated that she
would be forced to allow the mutilation of her daughter against her will." Id.
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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GRANTED ASYLUM TO A MOTHER
WHO FEARED HER DAUGHTER'S GENITAL MUTILATION

In Abay v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a mother
and her daughter qualified for asylum based on their fear that the
daughter would be subjected to genital mutilation if they returned to
their native country.' 17 The court first granted the daughter refugee status
because she possessed a well-founded fear of persecution based on her
fear of undergoing genital mutilation. 1 8 The court then held that the
mother was independently eligible for asylum based on what it termed a
"governing principle in favor of refugee status" for parents whose child
may face grave harm if the child were to return to the parent's home
19
country.'
Yayeshwork Abay and her seventeen-year-old daughter, Burhan
Amare, were citizens of Ethiopia. 120 They lawfully entered the United
States on tourist visas and subsequently applied for asylum.12 1 Amare
based her asylum application on her fear that she would be subjected to
genital mutilation at the hands of her relatives and her future in-laws if
she returned to Ethiopia. 122 Her mother, Abay, based her asylum claim
on, inter alia, her own fear that her daughter would be subjected to
genital mutilation in Ethiopia. 23 Specifically, she argued that the genital
mutilation of her daughter "and its consequences would cause [Abay]
mental suffering sufficient to constitute persecution. 124 The
immigration judge denied both Abay's and Amare's claims for
asylum, 125 and the BIA affirmed without opinion. 26 Abay and Amare
appealed their claims to the Sixth Circuit, 127 which reversed the BIA's

117. Abay, 368 F.3d at 635-36.
118. Id. at 640.
119. Id. at 642.
120. Id. at 635, 644.
121. See id. at 636.
122. Id. at 636.
123. Id. at 636, 640-41. Abay also claimed to have been persecuted in the past on account of her
Amhara ethnicity, her Pentecostal Christian religious practice, and her membership in the All
Amhara People's Organization. Id. at 636. The Sixth Circuit made no findings as to whether these
claims were sufficient to establish asylum eligibility for Abay. See id. at 640-42.
124. Id. at 642.
125. See id. at 639-41.
126. Id. at 635-36.
127. See id. at 636.
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28
denial of both claims. 1
The Sixth Circuit based its reversal of Abay's denial on what it called
a "governing principle" in favor of granting refugee status to mothers
like Abay. 129 The court drew this governing principle from a handful of
administrative decisions. First, the court turned to In re C-Y-Z-, in
which the BIA granted asylum to a husband based on his wife's forced
sterilization by the Chinese government. 130 Next, the court noted that
immigration judges had twice granted relief other than asylum to parents
who feared that their daughters would be subject to genital mutilation
should they return to the parents' country of origin. 131 In those cases, In
re Adeniji and In re Oluloro, the immigration judges granted
withholding of removal and suspension of deportation, respectively, to
the parents in each case.1 32 The final decision on which the Abay court
relied was In re Dibba, in which the BIA granted a motion to reopen an
asylum application to a mother based on her fear that her U.S. citizen
to genital mutilation upon returning to the
daughter would be subjected
133
family's home country.
Relying on these administrative decisions, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the BIA's denial of Amare's and Abay's asylum claims. 134 The court
held that Amare was a refugee because of her fear of undergoing genital
mutilation in Ethiopia. 135 With respect to Abay, it held that "a rational
factfinder would be compelled to find that Abay's fear of taking her
daughter [to] ...Ethiopia" and being forced to witness her daughter's
pain and suffering from genital36mutilation was well-founded, and that
Abay was, therefore, a refugee. 1

128. Id. at 642-43.
129. Id. at 642.
130. Id. at 641 (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. 915, 919-20 (B.I.A. 1997)); supra notes
77-83 and accompanying text (summarizing C-Y-Z- decision).
131. Abay, 368 F.3d at 641-42.
132. See id. (citing In re Adeniji, No. A41 542 131 (Dep't Justice Mar. 10, 1998)); In re Oluloro,
No. A72 147 491 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994); see also supra notes 107-13 (summarizing Adeniji
and Oluloro decisions).
133. In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857, at 1-3 (B.I.A.Nov. 23, 2001) (decision on motion to reopen).
134. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 642-43.
135. Id. at 640.
136. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
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IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ABAY
QUALIFIED AS A REFUGEE UNDER INA § 101(a)(42)(A)
The Sixth Circuit improperly expanded the scope of asylum when it
held that a mother, Abay, was independently eligible for asylum based
exclusively on her fear that her daughter, Amare, would be subjected to
female genital mutilation. To support its decision, the court relied on a
"governing principle" in favor of granting refugee status to applicants in
Abay's position. 137 However, the authorities cited by the court do not
support the existence of such a "governing principle." 138 The court
instead should have applied the statutory definition of refugee found in
INA § 101(a)(42)(A). Under this definition, harm to a daughter, even
where such harm rises to the level of persecution to the daughter, would
not, by itself, constitute persecution to the mother. 139 Yet, even if such
harm did constitute persecution to Abay, her fear of persecution was not
well-founded because her daughter was entitled to remain safely in the
United States. 140

A.

There Is No "GoverningPrinciple" in Favor of GrantingRefugee
Status to Mothers Like Abay

The Abay court's "governing principle" is not supported by case law.
The assertion that there is a "governing principle" in favor of granting
refugee status to mothers like Abay suggests some kind of consensus
among authorities on the matter. However, the decisions cited by the
court do not collectively create a "governing principle." In re C-Y-Zis distinguishable on its facts, and only one of the remaining
administrative decisions cited by the Abay court involves a standard as
stringent as that for asylum.14 1 Further, there is circuit court and
immigration court authority contrary to the Sixth Circuit's "governing
principle. 142
137. Id.
138. See infra Part IV.A (discussing lack of "governing principle" in favor of granting refugee
status to mothers like Abay).
139. See infra Part IV.B (applying INA's definition of asylum to Abay and concluding she did
not fit statutory requirements).
140. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 640; supra note 18.
141. Id. (citing In re Adeniji, No. A41 542 131 (Dep't Justice Mar. 10, 1998) (granting
application for withholding of removal to noncitizen father because U.S. citizen daughters might be
forced to undergo genital mutilation if they returned with father to family's home country)).
142. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying asylum to mother
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The Abay court inappropriately relied on C-Y-Z- because that case
merely created a very narrow exception to the requirement that the
applicant be the victim of persecution where there has been forced
sterilization of a spouse. 143 The difference between the facts of C-YZ- and those of Abay is material in two ways. First, precluding a wife
144
from bearing and raising children similarly precludes her husband. In
contrast, performing genital mutilation on a daughter does not have the
145
same sort of direct effect on her mother. Because the mother does not
similarly suffer mutilation with her daughter, the mother's situation is
not analogous to the situation of the husband, who becomes a victim of
persecution when his wife is subjected to coercive population control
policies. Second, the C-Y-Z- board's holding is supported by
Congress's goal in passing the amendments to the INA regarding
control policies: to provide relief for persecuted
coercive population
"couples."' 146 No analogous provision exists stating that one of the INA's
purposes47is to keep asylee children together with their noncitizen
parents. 1
Of the three remaining administrative decisions cited by the Abay
notwithstanding the risk that her daughters may undergo female genital mutilation if they were to
return to mother's home country); Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying a
petition for review by parents whose daughter was at risk of undergoing genital mutilation in the
parents' home country); Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
noncitizen parents are not eligible for asylum based exclusively on daughter's risk of undergoing
genital mutilation); In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001); In re Oluloro, No. A72
147 491 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994).
143. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 641; In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 917-18 (B.I.A. 1997)
(en banc) (holding that applicant established eligibility for asylum by virtue of his wife's forced
sterilization).
144. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2004); Lin v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1027,
1041 (9th Cir. 2004).
145. Compare Chen, 381 F.3d at 226 ("[P]erforming a forced abortion or sterilization procedure
on one spouse constitutes persecution of the other spouse because of the impact on the latter's
ability to reproduce and raise children."), and Lin, 356 F.3d at 1041 (noting that forced sterilization
of wife could be "imputed" to her husband, "whose reproductive opportunities the law considers to
be bound up with those of his wife"), with Abebe, 379 F.3d at 759 (holding that mother may not
apply for asylum based on potential genital mutilation of her daughter), and Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618
(holding that a "parent... may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential
hardship to the alien's United States citizen child").
146. See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996); see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that reason for decision in C-Y-Z- was "to fulfill Congress's goal in

passing the amendments-to provide relief for 'couples' persecuted on account of an 'unauthorized'
pregnancy").
147. This stands in contrast to the INA's express provision for the reunification of asylee parents
and their noncitizen children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2000).
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court, two were decided under less stringent standards of review than the
standard applied in asylum cases. 148 In In re Oluloro, the immigration
judge granted suspension of deportation to a mother who feared the risk
of genital mutilation to her U.S.-bom daughters. 149 INA § 240A(b)(1)
provides for this remedy, now called cancellation of removal, where
certain basic criteria are met and removal would result in hardship to the
noncitizen's U.S. citizen child. 150 Abay, on the other hand, applied for
asylum under INA § 101(a)(42)(A), which does not allow derivative
relief for parents based on potential harm to their children. 15' Oluloro
was, therefore, inapposite.
Similarly, the BIA's decision in In re Dibba, which allowed the
applicant to reopen her case to apply for asylum, 152 lends little support to
the "governing principle" fabricated by the Abay court. A decision to
reopen a case is not tantamount to granting the relief for which the case
was reopened. To reopen a case, the moving party needs only to show
"some likelihood of success on the merits, part of a relatively low
standard of review."' 53 Thus, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Dibba is
misplaced because it was decided under a lower standard.
The Abay court declined to mention, much less distinguish,
administrative authority that conflicts with its "governing principle."' 154
To support its principle, the court pointed out that, in In re Adeniji, the
immigration court granted withholding of removal to a father because of
his fear that, should he be removed, his U.S. citizen daughters would
return with him to Nigeria and be forced to undergo genital
mutilation. 55 However, in In re Anonymous, the immigration court
denied the mother's asylum application under similar circumstances.
There, the applicant mother claimed to have a well-founded fear that her
daughter would be subjected to genital mutilation upon returning to their
148. See generally In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001) (applying application to
reopen standard); In re Oluloro, No. A72 147 491 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994) (applying
suspension of deportation standard).
149. Oluloro, No. A72 147 491, at 14-18.
150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
151. See id. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (establishing derivative asylum only for spouses and children of
asylees that qualify under INA § 101(a)(42)(A)).
152. Dibba, No. A73 541 857, at **2-3.
153. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See Anonymous, at 2, 12 (Dep't Justice Apr. 28, 1995), available at
http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/40.pdf.
155. See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Adeniji, No. A41
542 131 (Dep't Justice Mar. 10, 1998)).
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home country of Sierra Leone. 156 Anonymous is more analogous to Abay
than any of the BIA or INS cases cited by the Abay court because it
involved an application for asylum,1 57 not suspension of deportation,"'
59
withholding of removal,' or a motion to reopen.'60
Additionally, no authority from the circuit courts of appeals supports
the Sixth Circuit's "governing principle." The other circuits that have
addressed the issue have uniformly denied asylum to mothers like
Abay.16 ' The Seventh Circuit twice denied asylum to mothers whose
U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident daughters were at risk of
undergoing genital mutilation if they returned to their mother's home
country.1 62 Likewise, in Abebe v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit denied a
petition for review by an applicant whose eight-year-old daughter was in
danger of undergoing genital mutilation in the applicant's home
country. 163 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit, under similar facts, held that
noncitizen parents "are not eligible for asylum under the general asylum
provisions based solely on their daughter's risk of being subject[ed] to
64
[female genital mutilation] if she is returned to Nigeria."'
Given the factual and legal dissimilarities among the cases relied on
by the Sixth Circuit; the disagreement among the immigration courts on
the issue; and the substantial circuit court holdings contrary to the Abay
court's, the Sixth Circuit did not reasonably find a governing principle.
Although the court granted Abay's daughter, Amare, refugee status65
presumably putting her on the road to being granted asylum' -Abay
66
did not qualify for derivative asylum.' Consequently, the Sixth Circuit
156. Anonymous, at 2, 12.
157. Id.
158. See In re Oluloro, No. A72 147 491, at 20 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994).
159. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 641-42 (citing Inre Adeniji, No. A41 542 131 (Dep't Justice Mar. 10,
1998)).
160. See In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857, at 1-3 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001).
161. See Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2004); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d
692, 697, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2004); Oforji v! Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003); Osigwe v.
Ashcroft, 77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
162. See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 697, 704-05 (denying asylum to mother despite risk of genital
mutilation to legal permanent resident daughters); Oforji, 354 F.3d at 609, 618 (denying asylum to
mother despite risk of genital mutilation to U.S. citizen daughters).
163. Abebe, 379 F.3d at 759-60.
164. Osigwe, 77 Fed. Appx. at 235.
165. See supra note 18.
166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2000) (providing derivative asylum for spouses and children,
but not parents, of refugees granted asylum).
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should have examined whether Abay satisfied the elements of INA
§ 10 1(a)(42)(A) to independently qualify for asylum.
B.

A bay Fails to Qualifyfor Asylum Under the Statutory Definition of
"Refugee "

Assuming that Abay relies exclusively on her fear of her daughter's
genital mutilation; the ground upon which the Sixth Circuit based its
finding, 167 Abay does not meet the definition of refugee 168 for three

reasons. First, any mental harm Abay would suffer as a result of the
genital mutilation of her daughter does not rise to the level of
persecution.' 69 Second, Abay lacked a well-founded fear of persecution
because, even if her daughter were genitally mutilated, it would not
indicate that Abay would likely be harmed in the future. 170 Finally, once
her daughter became a refugee, Abay no longer possessed a wellfounded fear of persecution because her daughter could remain in the
71
United States without the risk of female genital mutilation. 1
1.

PersecutionofAbay's DaughterIs Not "Persecution" ofAbay

The mental injury Abay would suffer were her daughter to undergo
genital mutilation could not rise to the level of persecution because there
was no showing that Abay would be physically harmed in connection
with her objection to the practice of female genital mutilation on her
daughter. 172 Unlike the applicants in Lopez-Galarza and O-Z- & IZ-, where mental suffering was found to be just one element of the
persecution of the applicants, 173 Abay did not claim she would be
physically harmed in connection with her mental suffering. 174 Likewise,
167. See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 640-42 (6th Cir. 2004).
168. INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A)).
169. See infra Part IV.B.1.
170. See infra Part IV.B.2.
171. See infra Part IV.B.3.
172. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 635-36.
173. See Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding past persecution
because of "severe and long-lasting" psychological harms associated with petitioner's treatment
while imprisoned, which included rape); In re O-Z- & I-Z-,
22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25-26 (B.I.A.
1998) (considering mental suffering caused by beatings and humiliation of applicant's son as
element of applicant father's persecution, where father also suffered repeated beatings and received
multiple handwritten threats of physical harm).
174. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 635-36. Although Abay was subjected to genital mutilation as a child,
id. at 639, this would not constitute past persecution sufficient to prevail on an asylum claim
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Abay's mental injury is distinguishable from that of the petitioner in
Sangha, where the applicant's mental suffering was accompanied by
threats of physical harm. 175 Instead, Abay claimed that, by itself, the
176
However,
genital mutilation of her daughter constituted persecution.
case law does not support this position. 177 As the law currently exists,
any mental suffering Abay may endure, though distressing, would not
rise to the level of persecution.
2.

Abay Could Not Have a Well-Founded Fearof Persecution
Because the GenitalMutilation of Her Daughter Would Not
Indicate Any Probabilityof FutureHarm to Abay

Abay does not fit within any of the circumstances in which harm to a
family member can serve as a basis of a well-founded fear of
persecution. Outside of the coercive population control context, an
applicant can base his or her well-founded fear on harm to family
members only where such harm indicates that the applicant will be
harmed in the future. 178 However, the genital mutilation of Abay's
daughter would not indicate a likelihood of harm to Abay in the future.
First, the possibility that her daughter, Amare, will be forced to undergo
female genital mutilation does not indicate that Abay will undergo the
procedure in the future. The procedure is normally carried out only once
on its victims, 179 and Abay was already genitally mutilated as a young
girl. 180 Second, the desire of Amare's relatives to subject her to genital
mutilation, while perhaps malicious,' 8' is presumably not intended to
because a woman who has been subjected to genital mutilation is not likely to be subjected to the
practice anew.
175. Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997).
176. Abay, 368 F.3d at 636, 641-42.
177. See Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2004); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692,
697-98 (7th Cir. 2004); Ofoji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003); Osigwe v. Ashcroft,
77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
178. See Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 845 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that "[t]o succeed in
[a] claim of derivative persecution, the [petitioner] must show a pattern of persecution closely tied
to the petitioner") (internal citations omitted); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir.
2003); Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that to show derivative
persecution, an applicant must "show that her family's political opinions have been imputed to her
and that she has suffered or will suffer persecution as a result").
179. See Female Genital Mutilation,supra note 8.
180. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 639.
181. See In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) ("[Female genital mutilation] 'has
been used to control wom[e]n's sexuality' .. . [and] is characterized as a form of 'sexual
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persecute her mother, Abay, but rather to effectuate a circumcision of
Amare 1 82 Third, Amare's relatives' desire to perform genital mutilation
on her is not due to mistaken identity.' 83 Finally, the target of the genital
mutilation is not Amare's family, but Amare herself.1 84 In fact, it is
85
Abay's family who wishes to inflict the procedure on Amare.1
3.

Any Well-FoundedFearAbay Possessed Vanished When Her
Daughter Was GrantedRefugee Status

Even if Abay possessed a well-founded fear of persecution, Abay
could no longer reasonably hold this fear once her daughter became a
refugee because her daughter would be eligible to remain in the United
States. 186 Thus, the chance that Abay would be persecuted in Ethiopia
became much lower than the chance contemplated by the most liberal
87
well-founded fear standard: a one-in-ten chance of being persecuted.
Using the reasonable person standard articulated in In re Mogharrabi,a
court should ask, "Would a reasonable mother fear persecution, based on
the genital mutilation of her daughter, where her daughter can legally
remain in the United States?"' 88 With the exception of the Sixth Circuit
in Abay, circuit courts that have addressed this question have answered

oppression' that is 'based on the manipulation of women's sexuality in order to assure male
dominance and exploitation."').
182. See Female Genital Mutilation, supra note 8. The World Health Organization lists several
reasons for different cultures' practice of female genital mutilation. Id. However, none relates
directly to the mother of the girl on whom genital mutilation is to be practiced. Compare Abay, 368
F.3d at 640-41 (noting that Amare may be targeted by her family for genital mutilation), with
Meza-Manay v. INS, 139 F.3d 759, 761-64 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding applicant was intended target of
terrorist group Shining Path in Peru where group threatened applicant and her husband, bombed
husband's car, shot at husband, attempted to kidnap her children, and bombed in-laws' home).
183. Compare Abay, 368 F.3d at 640 (noting that threat of genital mutilation to Amare comes
from her relatives and future husband and his relatives-people who could not reasonably mistake
her identity), with Lopez-Carillo v. INS, No. 97-70463, 1998 WL 19630, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 12,
1998) (holding that applicant failed to establish he was refugee because he lacked direct and specific
evidence that his brother's murderers had intended to kill applicant instead of applicant's brother).
184. Compare Abay, 368 F.3d at 640-41 (noting that Abay fears genital mutilation of one family
member: her daughter Amare), with Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting
asylum petition where all members of asylee's family had been persecuted for their membership in
political party).
185. Abay, 368 F.3d at 640.
186. Id.; supra note 18.
187. See Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990).
188. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987).
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in the negative.189
Abay's predicament was unenviable by any measure. Nonetheless,
she lacked a well-founded fear of persecution required under the current
immigration laws. 190 Once Abay's daughter, Amare, became a refugee,
the alleged agent of persecution-Amare's relatives, her future husband,
and his relatives in Ethiopia1 91-could no longer persecute Abay, unless
she chose to take Amare to Ethiopia. In Oforji v. Ashcroft, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the difficult choice left to a mother in such a
circumstance: she can either abandon her daughter in the United States
or take her daughter back to Ethiopia and risk her subjection to genital
mutilation.1 92 Nevertheless, the INA currently allows such mothers the
possibility of remaining in the United States only where they have been
present in the United States for at least ten years and are eligible for
cancellation of removal. 93 Asylum, as several circuit courts of appeals
have pointed out, 194 is not a remedy available for such mothers because
they lack the required well-founded fear of persecution.
In sum, because Abay did not meet the statutory definition of a
refugee, the Sixth Circuit erred in finding her eligible for asylum. The
court's reliance on a few administrative decisions as a "governing
principle" was inappropriate because there are more analogous
administrative decisions to the contrary and the weight of circuit court
authority pulls in the opposite direction of this governing principle.
Under INA § 101 (a)(42)(A), Abay did not meet the definition of refugee
for two reasons. First, the persecution she alleged did not amount to
persecution to Abay. Second, once her daughter gained refugee status,
Abay lost any well-founded fear of persecution she may have originally
had.
189. See Abebe v. Ashcroft 379 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2004); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692,
697-98 (7th Cir. 2004); Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003); Osigwe v. Ashcroft,
77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
190. See Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617-18 ("[T]he question before us is whether th[e] potential hardship
to citizen children arising from the mother's deportation should allow an otherwise unqualified
mother to append to the children's right to remain in the United States. The answer is no.");
at
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28,
Apr.
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to
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0.pdf
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191. Abay, 368 F.3d at 640.
192. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617.
193. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A) (2000).
194. See Abebe, 379 F.3d at 759; Olowo, 368 F.3d at 697-98, 704-05; Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618;
Osigwe, 77 Fed. Appx. at 235.
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CONCLUSION

Because courts now recognize forms of persecution aimed
particularly at children-which were not acknowledged by Congress at
the time of the asylum provisions' addition to the INA' 95-as valid
grounds for asylum, a gap in the law has developed that Congress must
fill. Parents of victims of persecution such as female genital mutilation
are required to show separate persecution to themselves in order to join
their children in the United States. In order to remedy this problem,
Congress should grant all parents accompanying or following to join
their child the same status as their child-a remedy already afforded to
spouses and children of asylees under INA § 208(b)(3)(A). The
legislature has already done this with two of the more recent
amendments to the INA. One amendment created "T" visas, which allow
human trafficking victims under the age of twenty-one to immigrate
their parents, either because the children were the victims of severe
human trafficking and assisted the government in the investigation and
prosecution of the offenders, or because the children were under the age
of eighteen when trafficked.196 A similar provision allows parents to
immigrate if their minor children were victims of certain violent
crimes.197
By providing asylum applicants' parents with the opportunity to
immigrate with their children to the United States-and therefore to
keep families together-these provisions reflect the newly recognized
reality that children are more vulnerable than adults to certain forms of
persecution, such as human trafficking, sexual abuse, and female genital
mutilation. As a result of this vulnerability, they are often the principal
applicants for relief from such persecution. Unfortunately, however, the
derivative asylum provisions have yet to incorporate parents of asylees
as asylum beneficiaries. Consequently, mothers in Abay's position are
faced with a "choice no mother wants to make": 198 abandon their
daughters in the United States or expose their daughters to persecution.
However, the goal of expanding asylum law to grant relief to such
mothers is not furthered by decisions such as Abay v. Ashcroft, which
purport to expand the law but provide no solid basis on which to do so.
195. See supra note 3.
196. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2000)) (establishing "T"

visas).
197. See id. § 101(a)(15)(U) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)) (establishing "U" visas).
198. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617.
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A more desirable alternative would be for Congress to amend INA
§ 208(b)(3)(A) to include parents of asylees.
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